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ABSTRACT
In the modern era of computing, processors are increasingly susceptible to soft errors.
Current solutions in both hardware and software enable error detection and correction. Some
of these errors, however, go unnoticed by detectors and manifest as silent data corruptions
(SDCs) at the application level. Injecting errors into the system and evaluating the outcomes
is one method to uncover SDC-causing errors and determine an application’s overall resilience
to soft errors. The number of possible locations that errors may appear in is large, therefore
requiring many injection experiments.
One resiliency analysis tool, Relyzer, addresses this issue by performing a comprehensive
program analysis to create a small subset of the error injection experiments that can account
for the entire application. The limitation of Relyzer is that current analysis can only be per-
formed on one hardwarware instruction set architecture (ISA). Software is usually compiled
to multiple ISAs in order to support users with varying hardware configurations.
The primary contribution of this thesis is building Relyzer+, an open source version of
Relyzer implemented using the gem5 simulator. This enables the capability to analyze
multiple ISAs and consequently support multiple hardware configurations in the long-term.
Specifically, in this work, we develop support for x86. We also evaluate applications across
ISAs by generating error resiliency profiles for both x86 and SPARC. After studying five
workloads from different domains, we find that in general, application soft error resiliency
varies based on the selection of the ISA. The percentage of static instructions that yield
SDCs is, on average, 68% for x86 and 60% for SPARC, for the applications we studied.
Furthermore, this work opens doors to future research in application-level soft error resiliency
analysis.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
As the transistor count and complexity of a processor increases, the likelihood of soft errors
caused by high-energy alpha particle strikes also increases [1, 2]. This is problematic because
such trends in transistor scaling encompass a wide array of computing platforms. Therefore,
developing reliable systems no longer pertains to niche workloads alone. Moreover, in the
majority of scenarios, execution is error-free, so overprotecting an application may result
in significant overhead. Both of these problems necessitate development of reliable systems
that incur minimal overhead.
Hardware and software engineers currently combat soft errors to a certain extent by in-
corporating error correction and detection mechanisms into the target system [3, 4, 5, 6].
Despite efforts to develop and deploy with soft error resilience in mind, the nature of the
applications themselves may dictate how errors manifest and propagate throughout the sys-
tem [7, 8, 9, 10].
Emerging workloads such as recognition, mining, synthesis (RMS) and several machine
learning algorithms are resilient by nature, as they tolerate imprecision and accuracy in their
computation by design [11, 12]. On the contrary, software used in safety-critical systems such
as avionics and autonomous vehicles may be more sensitive to soft errors, especially Silent
Data Corruptions (SDCs). An SDC is a classification of errors that are undetectable during
execution and corrupt program output. Therefore, SDCs are an important subset of error
outcomes that need to be addressed when analyzing a program’s error resilience.
A common approach for uncovering SDCs is to simulate application execution, introduce
errors by corrupting state during runtime, and empirically evaluate the outcome. Within
the simulation, we define an error site as any potential location in which an error may be
injected. Applications can execute trillions of instructions, and injecting into every error site
is computationally expensive. Therefore, an effort must be made to select appropriate error
sites to inject into that provide enough insight on the portions of the application that are
most vulnerable to SDC-causing soft errors.
One technique to error site selection involves taking a statistical approach and sampling
error sites [13, 14]. The main drawback to this method is that sampling such error sites does
not provide any insights for SDCs outside the sampled regions. Consequently, the statistical
approach lacks comprehensive analysis of an application from end-to-end.
An alternative is to employ heuristics that leverage knowledge of the execution behavior
such as control flow or load/store patterns to categorize a multitude of error sites into one
outcome category. There are several modern fault injection tools that take these heuristics
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into account to group error sites together and perform error injection in only one representa-
tive from within that group [15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. The remainder of error sites are pruned,
or equalized to the injection outcome of the representative.
One specific tool, Relyzer [16], provides a detailed and comprehensive outlook of applica-
tion resiliency. Relyzer orchestrates control and store-based heuristics in addition to precise
techniques to prune a significant portion of the error sites. Analysis is done at the instruction
set architecture (ISA) level. This is advantageous because users can abstract away most of
the processor’s low-level hardware execution. The ISA-level analysis provides insights into
outcomes from errors that manifest as single bit-flips in a processor’s user-visible architec-
tural registers. Subsequently, by modeling errors in this fashion, performing bit-flips in these
registers indicates the assembly instructions that are vulnerable to SDCs.
Although Relyzer is robust, one of it main limitations is its infrastructure. The tool relies
on Wind River Simics [21], a proprietary full system simulator. The infrastructure is also
designed to handle only applications compiled for the SPARC ISA. The restrictions imposed
from both the simulator and ISA make adoption of the tool challenging.
The main contribution of this work is the development of Relyzer+, an expansion to
Relyzer that enables support for more ISAs, beginning with x86. To perform the afore-
mentioned experimental infrastructure reconstruction, we build our foundations on the open
source gem5 simulator [22]. This facilitates the inclusion of future ISAs into the tool because
the computer architecture research community uses gem5 as one of its main platforms for
testing new hardware designs.
Building Relyzer+ requires significant engineering effort in order to support x86 analysis on
gem5. Relyzer’s original algorithms assume constant register size and instruction encoding
length, which is not the case with x86. We also require the development of an injector
module within gem5 that performs single bit-flips in the CPU registers at the appropriate
instance in time. Even with the added complexity, we succeed in implementing Relyzer+ on
both a different simulation platform and ISA.
We then perform fault injection experiments on both x86 and SPARC. For preliminary
evaluation, we analyze five workloads from different domains. Each application undergoes
Relyzer+’s pruning techniques to reduce the number of error sites. We perform an additional
validation of the heuristics to verify that the grouping of error sites yield the same outcome.
After performing injections in the remainder of error sites, we analyze the distribution of
outcomes over all static instructions and compare the percentage of SDC-causing instructions
between the two ISAs.
The average accuracy, or correct outcome prediction rate for each heuristic on x86 is
above 96%, indicating strong validation. From prior experiments [20], SPARC also exhibits
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a high validation accuracy. Additionally, we calculate the pruning effectiveness for each
application, which indicates the fraction of error sites pruned out of the total error sites.
Across all studied workloads, the average pruning effectiveness is 95% for x86 and 83%
for SPARC. After performing injection experiments, on average, Relyzer+ identifies that
approximately 68% of static instructions yield SDCs for x86, and 60% of static instructions
yield SDCs for SPARC.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: First, we elaborate on concepts re-
lated to ISAs, Relyzer’s pruning techniques, and the gem5 infrastructure. Next, we describe
Relyzer+’s implementation of program analysis and error injection using gem5. The subse-
quent chapter describes the methodology of validating heuristics and evaluating workloads
using the new infrastructure. We then analyze the preliminary results of our error injection
experiments. In the remaining chapters, we discuss the relationship between Relyzer+ and
existing tools and conclude by suggesting future research directions.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce the key concepts necessary to grasp the contributions estab-
lished in this work.
2.1 INSTRUCTION SET ARCHITECTURES
Assembly is a low-level programming language that incorporates instructions that closely
reflect the machine code executed by a CPU. The actual instruction set architecture (ISA)
enumerates all possible assembly instructions that a programmer may require.
The two primary categories of ISAs are elaborated below:
1. Reduced Instruction Set Computing (RISC) - Each instruction’s encoding is
fixed in length. Operations are relatively simplistic because they execute in one CPU
clock cycle. SPARC is an example of a RISC ISA.
Figure 2.1 illustrates instructions from a disassembled SPARC binary. The leftmost
column gives the PC associated with a particular instruction. The information in the
middle, namely the set of 4 bytes followed by the translated operation (or opcode),
provides all of the required encoding for a CPU to process and execute an instruction.
Register operands (denoted by a “%” symbol) and constant data values appear in the
rightmost column. Each PC offset is 4 bytes because of the fixed instruction length.
The advantage to using a RISC ISA is that the other aspects of the CPU become
simpler to design, especially the decoding unit that is responsible for translating each
instruction and issuing the necessary commands for correct execution.
2. Complex Instruction Set Computing (CISC) - Each instruction can vary in
length and subsequently can perform multiple operations before incrementing the PC.
x86 is an example of a CISC ISA.
Figure 2.2 depicts sample instructions for x86. The key difference between RISC and
CISC becomes clear when examining the second column, signifying different lengths
of instruction encoding.
A benefit to using CISC is that few instructions can essentially decode to powerful
sequences of computation. Another effect as evidenced in Figure 2.2 is that code
becomes more compact since fewer bytes may be required for simpler operations such
as pushing a register onto the stack.
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Figure 2.1: Example instructions of the SPARC ISA.
The largest drawback to CISC is its complexity. x86 in particular has small registers
that access part of a larger register. For example, %eax refers to the lower 32 bits of
%rax. The variable-length instruction encoding is associated with a complex decoder
unit that requires multiple cycles to decode each instruction.
2.2 RELYZER
Relyzer is a tool that incorporates program analysis and heuristics to determine the out-
comes of single-bit transient errors at the ISA-level. Relyzer’s heuristics group error sites
based on similar control flow or store behavior through the notion of equivalence classes.
In this context, an equivalence class is defined as a group of dynamic instructions with the
same static PC that are expected to yield the same outcome in the presence of a bit-flip in
the same register bit.
A pilot is a random representative from among the equivalence class. Injections performed
on the pilot reflect the behavior for the entire population, or total members of that respective
Figure 2.2: Example instructions of the x86 ISA.
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equivalence class. All remaining members of the equivalence class are pruned as a result.
Consequently, pruning becomes more effective as the population increases.
Equivalence classes fall under two categories: control equivalence and store equivalence.
For both categories, a portion of the analysis requires processing basic blocks, or sequences
of instructions separated by control instructions with a single entry and single exit point.
We detail the classification procedure of each type below:
1. Control Equivalence - given a basic block A1 and a control flow depth d, record the
next d sequence of basic blocks, also known as a control pattern. Repeat for A2, or
the same basic block occurring later in time. If A2 records the same sequence of basic
blocks as A1, equalize all non-store dynamic instructions in A1 and A2.
2. Store Equivalence - for a particular store instruction s1, record its destination ad-
dress and subsequent static load instructions that read from this address. Continue
recording loads until either a new store instruction writes to the same address, or the
program terminates. Repeat for s2, or the same static store instruction but executed
later in time. If s2 records the same static load instructions as s1, equalize s1 and s2.
In addition, use store equivalence to equalize any instructions that s may depend on
that are within the same basic block.
Precise techniques, such as def-use analysis and address bounding, prune based on ex-
pected error site behavior. For example, we expect that a bit-flip in a definition (def)
register is equivalent to a bit-flip in its first use. Therefore, def-use analysis prunes def reg-
isters and equalizes to the error site of the first use within the same basic block. Assuming
the operating system (OS) can detect memory access violations, address bounding prunes
any register bit-flips that may directly cause such a violation.
Relyzer’s program analysis applies all of the aforementioned techniques to prune approxi-
mately 99.99% of error sites in the best case [20]. Injection experiments are then performed
on only the remaining error sites. Outcomes from Relyzer analysis are used to build a re-
siliency profile that highlights the distribution of error outcomes over the whole application.
2.3 ERROR OUTCOMES
There are three commonly used classifications for the potential outcomes of error injection:
1. Masked - The error propagation does not cause any visible effect of corruption, sig-
nifying that the output does not differ from the error-free output.
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2. Detected - The error eventually results in either a signal to the OS that causes the
program to crash, or the program hangs indefinitely.
3. Silent Data Corruption (SDC) - The impact of error is not visible to the user until
the output is compared with the error-free output. Any deviation from the error-free
output results in an SDC.
2.4 GEM5 SIMULATOR
Among the CPU simulators available, the gem5 simulator [22] has gained the most traction
in the computer architecture community for three main reasons. The first is that it is
fully open source. Second, active and ongoing development enables users to receive bug
updates and support for new features. Third, involvement from major processor design
teams (AMD and ARM) encourages collaborative efforts to develop potential industry-wide
solutions [23, 24, 25].
Gem5 is an event queue based simulator; i.e., system events are handled in the order
that they are received. The simulation continues until the event queue is empty. Figure 2.3
depicts behavior of the event queue processing.
An object in gem5 that can generate potential events is known as a SimObject. Example
SimObjects include the CPU, RAM, and Disk Image. The design implication of using
SimObjects enables quick configuration changes to the simulation system, such as including
multiple CPUs, more memory, or custom modules. All of these configurations are declared
in a user-defined script that gem5 reads at the time of startup.
Upon initialization, SimObjects may schedule their first event onto the queue, and to
simulate multiple operations occurring simultaneously, a time entry is given, denoted as
ti in Figure 2.3. In this example, events scheduled in t0 will be processed before t1 using
ProcessEvent(). Additionally, after processing an event in t0, a future event may be
scheduled even before all events finish in t0 and t1 via the SheduleEvent() call. The unit
of time measurement used in gem5 is a tick, which defaults to one picosecond. The time
interval t1 − t0 varies and generally depends on the system’s simulated clock frequency. For
example, a CPU running at 2.0 GHz uses a time interval of at least 500 ticks when scheduling
instruction events.
Gem5 supports two primary simulation modes: syscall emulation (SE), or full-system (FS)
simulation. In the former, there is no OS present, and it is typically used for faster runs
where the involvement of an OS is not necessary. The benefit of using FS is the ability to
handle signals and exceptions during application runtime. This is vital for error injection
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Figure 2.3: Visualization of gem5 simulator execution flow. The event-queue in the center
processes events in chronological order, and SimObjects schedule new events.
experiments that detect crashes.
Complex CPU models are also available for simulation, such as InOrder and O3, which
simulate in-order and out-of-order processor, respectively. A third model, Simple, assumes
that memory is available immediately, therefore speeding up the simulation significantly at
the cost of having inaccurate timing results. For error injection experiments where accurate
timing is not required, Simple suffices.
Additionally, gem5 offers three compilation modes that impact the performance: gem5.debug,
gem5.opt, and gem5.fast. As the name suggests, gem5.debug enables full debugging symbols
and is primarily used to test changes made to the source code. gem5.opt contains fewer de-
bugging symbols but is still able to gather trace data (explained in greater detail in Section
4). The most efficient compilation mode is gem5.fast, which ignores any unnecessary symbols
and subsequently executes in less time than the other modes. In any of the three modes,
the execution is deterministic, meaning the output of a program simulated in gem5.fast is
always equivalent to gem5.debug. Checkpointing at a triggered event in the simulation is
also supported in gem5. By combining checkpoints with gem5.fast, we are able to speedup
injection experiments.
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CHAPTER 3: RELYZER+
In this chapter, we overview the three phases of Relyzer+ from pre-injection to post-
injection analysis. Figures 3.1, 3.3, and 3.7 aid in visualizing each phase, and each figure
includes a key to distinguish which phases require gem5 simulation and the types of outputs
generated.
Phase 1 profiles an application to obtain its execution and memory access trace. Then,
using both the trace and supplementary information from the disassembly, Phase 2 adapts
and applies each pruning technique mentioned in Section 2.2 in order to build a pruning
database. With this data, Phase 3 selects pilots to perform injections on. Simulation results
are then aggregated to output the final resiliency profile.
We emphasize the description of the x86 implementation in order to address the intricacies
of CISC previously mentioned in Section 2.1.
The Relyzer+ implementation details discussed in this section are focused on the con-
ceptual aspects of operating on execution traces. In addition, we provide supplemental
information on the necessary gem5 functionality that one may require to further use and
implement new ISAs in the future.
3.1 PHASE 1: APPLICATION PARSING AND PROFILING
In this phase, we profile an application’s execution to obtain its sequence of dynamic in-
structions and memory accesses. Gem5 includes tracers, which are specific SimObjects used
to capture this data during simulation and store the trace onto disk for future processing.
Phase 1 also parses the application’s disassembly in order to record the properties of each
instruction such as the number of register operands.
3.1.1 Preparation
Before engaging in application profiling, the programmer must prepare each application
for the simulator. Outlined below are three essential setup steps:
1. Calculating Region of Interest - When disassembling the compiled binary, the user
must identify the start and end of the region of interest (ROI) for study for the given
workload. Creating a ROI aids in filtering out phases of the application such as I/O
and memory allocation that may not be relevant to the actual computation.
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Figure 3.1: Details of the first phase of analysis, primarily generating application dynamic
trace data as well as parsing the application disassembly. If any instruction accesses mem-
ory, then the simplified trace includes additional fields to indicate the appropriate memory
operations. All other instructions leave these additional fields blank.
Because modern compilers aggressively optimize the assembly, finding the PCs asso-
ciated with the beginning and end of the ROI may not be easily discernible. One
technique is to inline dummy instructions into the source code, such as “mov %rax,
%rax”. After compilation, the user can easily find these inline instructions when exam-
ining the disassembly. The ROI should approximately begin with the first instruction
immediately following the dummy instruction. The procedure of inlining assembly
instructions is used when studying our applications.
2. Capturing Output - The output of the golden or error-free execution must be stored
and parsed in a reasonable manner. By default, gem5 provides a special application
binary that executes useful commands to interface between simulator and host ma-
chines. One of these commands is writefile(), which transfers a simulator file to the
host. Depending on the corresponding host file-system in which this file is written to,
a non-trivial portion of runtime may comprise of this file write.
Alternatively, the golden run’s output may be stored onto the simulated hard disk
ahead of time, and the user may decide to find golden and faulty output differences
within the simulator itself. The obvious drawback to this approach is that the simula-
tor is considerably slower than native hardware at performing such a comparison. This
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approach aims to remove the concern of incurring additional overhead when transfer-
ring files between simulator and host.
A third option is to create a custom script that parses the simulator’s console after
simulation is complete. In any of the above cases, the correctness of the experiment
does not depend on how the output is stored, but merely that post-injection scripts
have access to the golden and faulty outputs. In this study, we use gem5’s API to
transfer output from simulator to the host.
3. Checkpointing - If the anticipated dynamic execution trace is significantly large,
then instantiating periodic checkpoints may speedup trace generation. In gem5, con-
figuration flags enable checkpoint creation at regular intervals, or the user may decide
to modify the source code and inline gem5 checkpoint calls. This allows a checkpoint
to be created during irregular phases. Once the user creates the desired number of
checkpoints, parallel instances of the simulation can independently collect dynamic
instruction information, with the final process involving aggregation of the data. We
include this potential performance enhancement into the infrastructure for evaluating
larger workloads in the future.
3.1.2 Profiling
As mentioned in Section 2.4, gathering trace data requires running gem5.opt in order to
enable the tracer SimObjects. We enable the following standard tracers provided by gem5:
the instruction tracer, micro instruction tracer (exclusive for x86), and memory access tracer.
The simulation incurs additional runtime overhead when inserting tracer events into the event
queue for every new instruction or memory access.
Figure 3.1 highlights the stages of profiling, specifically gathering and parsing data from
the tracers. Gem5 provides an option to compress the raw tracer data, but it still contains
extraneous information such as SimObject names that are not relevant to the analysis.
We clean the tracers by storing only the required fields and subsequently create a simplified
trace. The precise data fields which each item in the simplified trace requires are the tick, PC,
and optional fields for memory access instructions (read/write operation and the respective
address). The specific tick recorded corresponds to the start of the instruction. Each tick
combined with the PC uniquely identifies a dynamic instruction. In this study, we only
record the PCs found within the boundaries of the disassembly. This constraint prevents
analysis of library and kernel code sequences where the source code derivations may not be
known.
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Figure 3.2: A trace decomposition of a complex instruction in x86. The final entry into the
simplified trace changes PC A’s tick from initially 1 to now 0, and memory access information
is stored appropriately.
One of the challenges to profiling x86 applications is that gem5 decodes each ISA-level
instruction into a series of micro instructions in order to address complex operations requiring
more than one CPU clock cycle. The default instruction tracer only captures the tick of the
final micro instruction. This is an issue because an instruction may begin executing several
ticks beforehand, so we need to perform injections at the tick of the first micro instruction.
To solve this problem, we enable and process a micro instruction tracer, which records the
ticks of all micro instructions in the program’s execution. We then find the appropriate ticks
that correspond to the first micro instruction of each complex instruction.
Also, the memory trace alone does not indicate which micro instructions access memory.
However, we can use a micro instruction’s tick to lookup and identify if a memory access
occurs at that same tick.
Figure 3.2 illustrates an example addressing and solving these issues. The complex in-
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struction “add [%rax], %rbx” loads the value stored at address %rax to a temporary register
%t1 in tick 0, and then computes the addition in tick 1. When collecting the trace data,
the tick recorded from the memory tracer equals the load micro instruction, or tick 0. The
instruction tracer does not record any new instruction until at least tick 1. We must simulate
an error injection at tick 0 instead of tick 1, but currently the trace does not indicate that
behavior. Also, if we use tick 1 to search for memory accesses, we encounter the issue of
being unable to find the memory read within the memory tracer.
A micro PC field is conveniently provided by the micro instruction tracer, and it stores the
original PC. Referring back to the example in Figure 3.2, the micro PC for the load is A.0,
indicating the instruction originated from PC A and is the first micro instruction. In the
simplified trace, we set PC A’s tick field to 0, which points to its first micro instruction. Also,
we search for tick 0 and tick 1 in the memory trace and find the memory access information
recorded at tick 0. We then append this information to the memory access fields for this
dynamic instruction. The merged result appears in the final, simplified trace.
In general, for every instruction executed by the application, we first identify its decom-
posed micro instructions. The first micro instruction’s tick corresponds to the beginning of
the instruction’s execution. In addition, for every micro instruction that accesses memory, we
lookup its tick within the memory access tracer and append the corresponding information
to the instruction’s entry in the simplified trace.
3.1.3 Parsing Disassembly
Another important process in Phase 1 is parsing the disassembly that contains all of the
application’s instructions. Each ISA requires its own parser in order to create an instruction
database as shown in Figure 3.1. The information stored in the database must include at
least the following fields: “PC,” “Op,” “IsControl,” “Src,” and “Dest.” The “IsControl” field
indicates that an instruction affects control flow. The “Op” field allows for a quick lookup
of information about the instruction. In x86, instructions such as addss (add scalar single-
precision value) only affect the lower 32 bits of a floating point register, so using this field
can indicate such behavior. The “Src” and “Dest” fields contain all source and destination
registers respectively. As mentioned in Section 3.1.2, we do not analyze any instructions
that do not belong of the application. Therefore, we also use the disassembly to identify and
remove such instructions from the raw execution trace.
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Figure 3.3: Overview of Phase 2, comprising of multiple pruning techniques. After applying
all such techniques, a pruning database is generated.
3.2 PHASE 2: ERROR SITE ANALYSIS
The primary purpose of this phase is to use both the instruction database and trace data
generated in Phase 1 in order to effectively prune error sites. Figure 3.3 summarizes the
processes that occur in Phase 2. Also, as mentioned in Section 2.2, the key techniques are:
address boundary calculation, control equivalence, store equivalence, and def-use analysis.
Each technique generates output that feeds into creating the final pruning database.
3.2.1 Address Boundary Calculation
We study an application’s dynamic memory profile by parsing its memory accesses found
in the simplified trace. This provides us with a range of valid addresses that the application
can access during runtime. We assume that errors in high order bits above the application’s
accessible address space are detectable by the system. Therefore, we prune all high order
bits of registers accessing memory since they may result in a memory access violation. In
order to effectively use this technique in a real system, the analysis should be performed on
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a representative set of application inputs.
3.2.2 Contiguous Blocks
As discussed in Section 2.2, the majority of Relyzer’s algorithms perform analysis at
the basic block level. Because Relyzer+ analyzes an execution trace, we alter Relyzer’s
algorithms accordingly. To do so, we introduce the notion of contiguous blocks. A contiguous
block is a set of contiguous instructions within a dynamic instruction trace that immediately
follow a control instruction and end with a control instruction. From a static instruction
perspective, there may be multiple contiguous blocks that start and end with the same PCs.
For clarity, we refer to a dynamic contiguous block as a contiguous block that is identified
based on its location in the execution trace. All of the algorithms mentioned in Section 2.2
that previously utilized basic block data structures now use contiguous blocks.
3.2.3 Contiguous Block Generation
We use both the simplified trace and instruction database from Phase 1 to create contigu-
ous blocks. We iterate through each entry in the trace and mark control instructions. These
marks identify the end of one contiguous block and the beginning of another contiguous
block. Each contiguous block has its own identifier: {PCstart, PCend}, where PCend is a con-
trol instruction. As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, this identifier is not unique. Therefore, we
also keep track of the tick of PCstart, which identifies a dynamic contiguous block. We then
use the trace to build a list of dynamic contiguous blocks. Subsequently, the list of dynamic
contiguous blocks is ordered chronologically; i.e., the first index in the list corresponds to
the contiguous block at the beginning of execution.
3.2.4 Control Equivalence
Once the trace is transformed into a list of dynamic contiguous blocks, we form control
equivalence classes based on the desired control flow depth d. To do this, we iterate through
each dynamic contiguous block in the list and find the control pattern, or sequence of d sub-
sequent contiguous blocks that the application traverses over. Because the list of contiguous
blocks is sorted chronologically, the control pattern is simply a sub-list starting from the cur-
rent index of the dynamic contiguous block to the next d indices. The control pattern is then
compared with previous patterns to ensure it was not observed previously. If this is the case,
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Figure 3.4: Organization of the data structures involved with control equivalence class gen-
eration, with a maximum control depth of 3 as an example. Whenever control patterns for
two or more contiguous blocks match, they are equalized. A1 and A2 are the only contiguous
blocks in this example where this is the case.
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then a new equivalence class forms. Otherwise, we equalize the current dynamic contiguous
block with the other dynamic contiguous blocks observing the same control pattern.
Figure 3.4 summarizes the aforementioned formation of control equivalence classes at the
contiguous block level. In the example, both A1 and A2 encounter the same control pattern
of [1, 2, 3], so we equalize A1 and A2. In the case of B, two different control patterns are
encountered, so B1 and B2 are not equalized.
One factor to consider when employing control equivalence is that the number of equiva-
lence classes per contiguous block may increase dramatically if many different control pat-
terns are observed at depth d. This is problematic for two reasons: A) the space required to
store the observed control patterns grows, and B) the pruning effectiveness decreases since
each new equivalence class adds an injection location. A method to combat the growth
is to dynamically reduce d. To do this, we define an equivalence class capacity c as a con-
straint. If the number of current equivalence classes N for a given contiguous block is greater
than c, reduce d until N ≤ c. When reducing d, all dynamic contiguous blocks need to be
re-equalized accordingly.
Once all equivalence classes are formed, we randomly select one pilot out of the members
of an equivalence class for each equivalence class and store for later parsing (Section 3.2.7).
3.2.5 Store Equivalence
Store equivalence consists of two parts. One part of store equivalence involves determining
the instructions each store instruction depends on. Again, we limit ourselves to analyzing at
the contiguous block level, so we reuse the program’s contiguous blocks generated previously.
To identify all instructions the store depends on, we begin with the store instruction and
traverse the contiguous block backwards. The first instruction a that defines the store
instruction’s source register is added to a list of instructions that this store depends on. The
chain of depending instructions continues from there, as instruction a has its own source
registers that depend on other instructions in the contiguous block. This process continues
until either the beginning of the contiguous block is reached, or there are no more instructions
that the store depends on. When building such dependence chains, an additional lookup
occurs for x86 that ensures that the def register names do in fact alias to the same source
register.
The second part of store equivalence equalizes multiple dynamic invocations of a given
static store instruction based on the subsequent loads observed. To do this, we filter the
execution trace to include only load and store instructions. Then, we apply the store equiva-
lence classification procedure from Section 2.2. Figure 3.5 exemplifies this procedure. Store
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Figure 3.5: Organization of the data structures involved with store equivalence class gener-
ation. For two or more dynamic stores, if the list of subsequent static loads are the same,
then the stores are equalized. In this example, a1 and a2 are equalized because they both
encounter loads b, c. In contrast, d1 and d2 are not equalized because d1 encounters e, and
d2 encounters f .
instructions a1 and a2 are within the same equivalence class since they both share the same
subsequent static loads: b and c. However, store instructions d1 and d2 are binned into
different equivalence classes because the subsequent load instructions are not identical.
Following the same procedure as control equivalence, we randomly select one pilot out of
the members from an equivalence class.
3.2.6 Def-Use Analysis
As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, we confine def-use analysis to the contiguous block level.
Consequently, the generated contiguous block data structures are also used for this technique.
The standard procedure for pruning def registers described in Section 2.2 requires mod-
ification in order to properly analyze x86 registers. Specifically, registers that have a size
ranging from 8-32 bits alias to the lower bits of a 64-bit register, therefore, accessing only
a portion of the register. As a result, partial def-use pairs can now form across registers
of different sizes. In order to capture the partial def-use pairs, we design two databases: a
Contiguous Block Def Register Database and an Instruction Def Register Database.
Figure 3.6 provides an example of how each instruction accesses the data structures to
address partial def-use pairs. The procedure for modifying the databases in this example is
as follows:
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Figure 3.6: Organization of the data structures involved with def-use analysis. PC A has
%rax as its def register, and PC B first uses the lower 32 bits of %rax via %eax. Whenever
a register is last defined, all appropriate fields within the Continuous Block Def Register
Database are filled with the corresponding PC. The Instruction Def Register Database stores
the bit fields that may be modified after a first use. This is shown in PC A’s entry in the
database, where PC B now occupies the lower bit fields.
1. Initially, the Contiguous Block Def Register Database is empty. When PC A is ana-
lyzed, we encounter a def of %rax. This is a 64-bit register, so we fill all fields in the
Contiguous Block Def Register Database for entry %rax with PC A.
2. Each PC also has its own entry in the Instruction Def Register Database. Again, %rax
uses all 64 bits, so all fields for entry PC A are initialized to PC A.
3. For each source register in PC B, we identify the 64-bit register alias. %eax aliases
to %rax in this case. The entry for %rax is checked within the Contiguous Block Def
Register Database.
4. We begin traversing the fields of entry %rax in the Contiguous Block Def Register
Database starting from the least significant bits to the most significant bits of the
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original source register, %eax. Therefore, we only access the lower 32-bit fields of
entry %rax. Each field that is not empty points to the def PC that last defined this
bit range. We go to the same field in this def PC’s entry within the Instruction Def
Register Database. If that corresponding field is equal to the original PC (A in this
case), then it has not been previously used. We replace this field with the current PC,
which is B. As a result, we correctly prune the lower 32 bits of %rax from PC A. In
general, any field that is later modified within the entry of the Instruction Def Register
Database indicates that the corresponding bit ranges are to be pruned.
Once we encounter a new contiguous block, we clear all PCs in the Contiguous Block
Def Register and repeat the process. The result of using these databases is that def-use
specifically prunes only the number of bits that are actually used.
3.2.7 Combining Analysis Files
Once all of the relevant analysis scripts complete, the resulting files then feed into a
pruning database generation module. The newly-formed pruning database provides enough
information to actually create the error injection campaign. The fields for the database are
displayed in Figure 3.3. We include a “DoInject” field in the pruning database to indicate
whether any registers need injections after pruning. If this flag is false, then we can skip over
this instruction. The “DefPC” field is relevant for mapping the PCs that first use the def
register (if applicable). In x86, this field also highlights which specific bits are pruned via
def-use and which still require injections. The “IsMem” field indicates that the instruction
contains registers accessing memory, so bits outside of the address bounds are to be pruned.
We use the “Control/Store” field to determine which equivalence class pruning technique to
use. By default, all store instructions and the instructions that the store depends on are
marked to select pilots using store equivalence. The remainder of instructions are marked
to select pilots using control equivalence.
3.3 PHASE 3: ERROR INJECTION EXPERIMENTS
The last phase of the error injection framework, depicted in Figure 3.7, creates injec-
tion experiments and performs the simulated injections. The pruning database, combined
with an ISA-dependent script, generates the list of injections to be performed. We iterate
through every instruction’s registers within the pruning database to create injections for all
equivalence classes.
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Identifying the registers and their corresponding lengths requires a user to provide the
proper ISA register decoder. This necessity becomes more apparent when calculating the
precise bits to inject into. For example, if the target register is only 32 bits in length, and the
address boundaries occur in the first 40 bits, then we take the minimum of the two lengths
and inject only into those bits, again assuming the user decodes the register length correctly.
The injection list contains all remaining error sites to perform injections upon completion
of Phase 2. Section 3.5 describes the gem5-related operations to perform injections. Even
after pruning, if a program’s injection list is too large to complete in a reasonable time,
then an alternative is to select only injections that account for the top X% of population
among all equivalence classes. In prior work, X ranged from 95% to 99% and still produced
tangible results [16, 20], but by not injecting into 100% of the population, the final outcome
may miss some SDCs. None of the injection lists in this study resulted in adjusting X, so
we explore injections that account for 100% of the population.
All injection experiments eventually aggregate to form one raw injection results file. We
use the pruning database once more to identify the outcome of the pruned def register bits
based on the injection of the first use. After determining the outcome, we insert the pruned
def register bits as well as the out-of-bound address bits into the results file. To simplify
this file, we categorize the results over all static instructions by identifying the worst case
outcome for each static instruction. The outcomes from best to worst case are: Masked,
Detected, and SDC. Relyzer+ outputs this resiliency profile after completing all phases.
3.4 ADDITIONAL ISA CONSIDERATIONS
Each ISA has its own design details that may slightly modify the algorithm. Some exam-
ples are listed below:
SPARC contains a branch delay slot to improve pipeline performance, so the compiler
often inserts or reorders instructions to fill in this slot. As a result, the actual sequence of
execution may appear out of order at a branch instruction. The delay slot affects contiguous
block generation, which now must account for another instruction following the branch when
computing the end of a contiguous block.
There are also certain condition code registers in SPARC such as %icc that are modified as
a side effect of other instructions. The ISA uses these registers to resolve branches. SPARC
includes internal registers that are not visible to the user such as the PSTATE register. To
simplify our analysis, we do not analyze condition code registers nor internal registers.
We already identified several x86 design challenges, and the following are more assumptions
to simplify the analysis. Registers used for SSE instructions, such as %xmm0 are 128 bits
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Figure 3.7: Overview of phase 3. Actual injection simulation, collection of outcomes, and
post-injection analysis occurs in this phase.
wide. However, in our study, we focus our analysis on the lower 64 bits because double-
precision floating point computation only affects these bits.
Like SPARC, x86 contains condition code registers such as RFLAGS and internal registers
such as %cr0 that we omit from analysis. To simplify further, we do not perform bit-flips in
registers that directly modify the stack such as %rbp and %rsp. However, instructions such
as push and pop are valid, provided that the register being pushed onto or popped from the
stack is not one of the above registers.
3.5 ERROR INJECTION IN GEM5
To actually inject errors into the simulation, an injector module attaches to the CPU
and performs bit-flips at the appropriate time in simulation. The injector is a SimObject,
so instantiating its parameters relies on modifying the full system configuration script as
mentioned in Section 2.4. We create additional parameters for the configuration script that
enable error injection at a particular tick, register, bit, and timeout value. A user now can
simultaneously launch multiple configurations, therefore either simulating injections into
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different error sites or injecting into different applications altogether.
To actually flip a bit of a particular register, we leverage the provided gem5 API functions
to read or write register values. We read the initial register value using getIntRegValue()
or getFloatRegBits(), and then flip the appropriate bit. We then set the register to its
faulty value using setIntRegValue() or setFloatRegBits(). If the register is a source,
then we perform the injection immediately. Otherwise, we proceed to the starting tick of the
next instruction and perform the injection at time. This is to ensure that the destination
register updates its value upon completion of the instruction.
The simulation runs to completion, and we store the final output. We then proceed to
bin the outcomes into the appropriate categories mentioned in Section 2.3. The simplest
way for categorizing the injection outcome as SDC is that the final output file differs from
the golden output file. On the other hand, if the files are identical, then we categorize the
outcome as Masked. We check the two files by using a standard diff utility.
There are several detectors used to bin outcomes as Detected. The most frequently used
are those that check for segmentation faults, exceptions, and error codes. The injector
SimObject contains a built-in timeout detector. We set its value such that conservatively
if the faulty run has executed more than twice the amount of ticks logged in the golden
execution, a timeout is triggered. Currently all detectors aside from the timeout detector
parse the simulator console to find detection symptoms, but in the future we plan to also
develop the appropriate SimObjects to further speedup the outcome binning process.
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CHAPTER 4: EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
This chapter outlines the necessary assumptions that we make when performing the anal-
ysis. We describe our error model, validation procedure, and workloads.
4.1 ERROR MODEL
This study focuses on analyzing single-bit transient errors in the integer and floating point
registers of dynamic instructions. As mentioned in Section 3.4, we do not inject errors into
condition codes registers and internal registers that are not directly accessible to the user.
We also do not inject into registers directly affecting the stack, such as %rsp and %rbp.
However, we still inject into instructions that implicitly modify these registers, such as push
or pop, provided that neither %rsp nor %rbp are being pushed onto or popped from the
stack.
4.2 VALIDATING HEURISTICS
So far, the heuristics are not supported with any level of confidence that the pilots selected
actually reflect error behavior of the entire population. Therefore, validation of both control
and store equivalence heuristics is crucial. If either heuristic does not exhibit high confidence,
then the remainder of the results lose significance because the pilot selected for injections
does not accurately account for the entire equivalence class. To perform validation, we inject
errors into other members from within the equivalence class and compare the outcomes to
the original pilot’s outcome.
Validating that every single member of an equivalence class will result in the same outcome
is expensive. Instead, we randomly sample members until we reach high confidence. We also
take a similar approach employed by previous work [20] by injecting into every 8th bit of
a register instead of iterating each bit sequentially to reduce the number of experiments
further. To attain a 95% confidence interval with an error margin of 5%, we sample up
to 400 members from within an equivalence class. We then continue to sample additional
equivalence classes with the limitation of approximately 200,000 injections per control and
store equivalence (due to simulation time constraints) for each application. Aggregating the
validation statistics for each application involves first identifying the original pilot outcome
per equivalence class. Then, we determine the outcome of the other sampled members. We
keep track of each outcome that correctly matches with the pilot’s original outcome, then
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Suite Application Domain Input
Parsec 3.0 [26] Blackscholes Financial Modeling 21 options
Swaptions 1 option
1 simulation
SPLASH-2 [27] LU Scientific Computing 16x16 matrix
8x8 block size
FFT Signal Processing 28 data points
ACCEPT [28] Sobel Image Processing 81x121 pixel image
Table 4.1: Applications studied across a variety of domains and suites.
divide by the total population sampled to compute the accuracy of the equivalence class.
Finally, we calculate a weighted average of the accuracy based on the population over all
sampled equivalence classes. Using a weighted average ensures that larger equivalence classes
contribute more towards overall accuracy.
4.3 WORKLOADS
We select workloads from the Parsec 3.0 [26], SPLASH-2 [27], and ACCEPT [28] bench-
mark suite. Table 4.1 summarizes each application, domain and input size. We set the value
for control equivalence capacity c = 50 and initial control pattern depth d = 50 for all appli-
cations. By using similar workloads from prior work [29], we carefully reduce the size of the
input in order to speedup injection runs but still capture each application’s relevant execu-
tion paths. For SPARC workloads, we reuse the memory profile information collected from
prior work [20] in order to calculate each application’s address boundaries (Section 3.2.1).
This affects SPARC results when comparing with x86 in Section ??, and understanding the
memory access behavior between ISAs is future work. Potential storage issues mentioned in
Chapter 3 were not observed in any of the workloads.
4.4 EXPERIMENTAL INFRASTRUCTURE
We use GCC [30] to compile x86 binaries and Solaris CC [31] to compile SPARC binaries.
In both cases, full optimizations (-O3) were enabled. We simulate x86 applications using
gem5 in FS mode with the Simple CPU model. SPARC applications are simulated on a
similar system but use Wind River Simics[21] as the simulation platform. In this study, a
higher number of processors is beneficial since each injection simulation operates indepen-
dently. We take advantage of this parallelism by running error injection simulations on a
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200-node cluster of 2.4GHz Intel Xeon E7-8870 processors with 252GB of total memory.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
This chapter describes preliminary results from evaluation. In this study, we compare
Relyzer+’s pruning effectiveness across x86 and SPARC. We also perform validation ex-
periments for x86. The chapter concludes by describing the outcomes of error injection
experiments across both ISAs.
In this study, SPARC results differ from previous work [20] because as mentioned in
Section 4.3, we reduce the input size of each workload.
Application ISA Initial Error Sites Total Pruning Remaining Error Sites
Blackscholes x86 21.8M 99.51% 107,308
SPARC 762,656 52.62% 361,349
FFT x86 7.1M 95.65% 309,469
SPARC 10.3M 94.34% 584,854
LU x86 4.2M 86.94% 551,266
SPARC 1.9M 71.96% 535,802
Swaptions x86 13.3M 93.73% 833,875
SPARC 23.6M 94.40% 1.3M
Sobel x86 183.2M 99.85% 273,289
SPARC 1.1B 99.97% 293,632
Table 5.1: Number of error sites pruned per application.
5.1 PRUNING EFFECTIVENESS
Table 5.1 displays pruning effectiveness for both ISAs, and Figure 5.1 provides a detailed
breakdown of each technique’s contribution to pruning. Aside from Blackscholes-SPARC, the
total error sites being pruned is significant for both ISAs. On average, pruning effectiveness
is 95.1% and 82.7% for x86 and SPARC, respectively. One possible explanation for the
reduced effectiveness in Blackscholes-SPARC is that the number of error sites is relatively
small compared to the other applications at 763,000. In fact, Blackscholes-SPARC only
executes 7153 dynamic instructions within its ROI. In general, control equivalence relies
on larger execution sizes with the assumption that the number of loops executed increases,
thereby equalizing more instructions. As expected, because of Blackscholes-SPARC’s small
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Figure 5.1: Pruning effectiveness for each ISA.
execution size, control equivalence’s pruning contribution is only 14.4%. With the exception
of LU-x86, there are also fewer remaining error sites for x86, and the difference ranges from
only 20,000 in Sobel to 485,000 in Swaptions.
x86 pruning effectiveness primarily comprises of control equivalence, which prunes 52.3%
of all error sites on average. Store equivalence prunes more for SPARC than x86 in the
average case at 21.8%. Analyzing the compiled binaries may lead to understanding the
pruning technique contributions between the two ISAs, and we leave that for future work.
5.2 VALIDATION
Figure 5.2 reports the validation accuracy per application. For every workload, outcomes
of different members of the equivalence classes almost always match the outcome from the
original pilot selected. This is evident from the high average accuracy of 97.7% for store
equivalence and 98.2% for control equivalence. There were some equivalence classes where
accuracy was near 0%. This scenario happens infrequently, however, at 0.06% of all equiva-
lence classes analyzed. Recall from Section 2.2 that a pilot is a randomly selected member
from the equivalence class. There is a chance that the pilot does not reflect the majority
of members within the equivalence class. Returning to the near-0% accuracy equivalence
28
Figure 5.2: x86 validation results for both control and store equivalence classes at 95%
confidence interval with 5% error margin. In both categories, accuracy is above 96%.
classes, if we select a different pilot and rerun validation experiments, then the accuracy will
significantly improve.
5.3 ERROR OUTCOMES
When analyzing Relyzer+’s error outcomes, determining a proper comparison point be-
tween RISC and CISC ISAs is challenging. The difficulties emerge from differences in in-
struction semantics, number of registers used per instruction, and number of instructions,
both static and dynamic. Subsequently, we opt to not report such statistics because of the
lack of a method to compare these values across ISAs fairly. Instead, we choose to equalize
with regards to the distribution of each application’s error outcomes (Masked, Detected, or
SDC). An advantage here is that although the absolute number of instructions and total
injections differs, from a relative standpoint, the distribution of error outcomes is directly
comparable.
We report the error outcomes in Figure 5.3. As mentioned in Section 3.3, we identify the
worst case outcome per PC as SDC, followed by Detected, and finally Masked. For both
ISAs, on average, more than 60% of PCs uncover SDCs. In principle, uncovering a high
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of outcomes for each PC based on the worst case injection outcome.
percentage of SDC-causing instructions indicates that the tool is effective at finding such
instructions. However, this does not take into account the number of dynamic invocations of
each PC. Based on the input size, the majority of the SDC PCs may only comprise a small
fraction of the total execution. Because the size of the input may not be known ahead of
time, we do not report on a dynamic instruction basis.
On average, 67.8% of static instructions yield SDCs for x86. Similarly, SPARC results
display a slightly reduced average percentage of SDC PCs at 60.4%. On the other hand,
all x86 applications except for x86-LU uncover fewer SDC-causing instructions. Further
analysis is required to understand the cause for such differences between ISAs.
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CHAPTER 6: RELATED WORK
We already mentioned Relyzer in Section 2.2, and the majority of related work also per-
forms error injection simulation experiments. Trade-offs between either accuracy, robustness,
or usability are distinguishing features for each contribution. In this chapter, we compare
and contrast various approaches to error injection.
Several recent tools also build upon gem5 as their base simulator, specifically MeRLiN [15]
which utilizes GeFIN [32] to simulate micro-architectural injections in an x86 O3 CPU.
Another error injection tool that operates at the micro-architectural level and also supports
both Alpha and x86 is GemFI [33]. This tool is open source, whereas GeFIN is not at the
time of publication. One primary drawback for these micro-architectural injection tools is
that as a CPU’s micro-architecture changes, new injection experiments must be performed
that accurately reflect those changes.
Other error injection tools, such as LLFI [34], analyze applications at the intermediate
representation (IR) level. IR is ISA-independent by design, so such an analysis would ideally
hold true regardless of the hardware architecture. However, there may be loss in error
site accuracy because IR still requires additional transformations before producing actual
assembly [35].
Finally, like Relyzer, there are related works that perform ISA-level analysis. FAIL* [17],
GangES [18], and Approxilyzer [16] are notable examples. A benefit to performing ISA-level
injections is that the results provide instruction-level resiliency information. System design-
ers can then utilize these results to create soft error protection schemes at the instruction-
level [36, 37]. FAIL* also uses gem5 and supports ARM but is limited to one pruning
technique: def-use analysis.
GangES and Approxilyzer are both works that extend Relyzer analysis. GangES groups
injection simulation experiments and periodically compares the simulator state after injecting
the error. This check allows for early injection termination if equivalent state is found, which
speeds up Relyzer. GangES’ performance enhancements may also find its way into our work
in the future.
Approxilyzer [16] classifies injection outcomes in a similar matter to Relyzer except that
SDCs are further binned based on the user-provided quality metric: SDC-Good, SDC-Maybe,
SDC-Bad, and DDC (Detectable Data Corruptions). This new spectrum indicates a varying
level of quality degradation in the final output. Precise classification of output corrup-
tions informs users that some regions of execution can be approximated. Performing an
Approxilyzer-level analysis is also supplemental to this work and adds the number of ap-
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proximable instructions as another comparison point between ISAs in future work.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 CONCLUSIONS
This work proposes key concepts to bring about a new error injection tool capable of
providing comprehensive analysis across more ISAs. By leveraging the open source gem5
simulator, we develop Relyzer+, which adapts Relyzer’s initial algorithms to operate on an
execution trace and supports x86. An analysis of Relyzer+’s equivalence class heuristics on
x86 indicates a high confidence that pruning is both effective and accurate, with average
accuracy above 96%. We also perform a preliminary comparison between x86 and SPARC.
Applications from both ISAs use Relyzer+’s pruning techniques to drastically reduce the
number of error sites. After performing error injection experiments, our results show that
different levels of SDCs were uncovered across each application. On average, 68% of static
instructions yield SDCs on x86. The percentage of static instructions yielding SDCs for
SPARC averages to 60%. We only establish a few comparison points in this work, and more
detailed evaluations are necessary to understand an ISA’s role in overall resiliency.
7.2 FUTURE WORK
With the provision of an open-source framework, any user can explore several new paths
in the domain of reliability and approximate computing. An intuitive first step is to develop
support of popular ISAs such as ARM. Performing an in-depth comparison between ISAs
is another direction that can reveal new insights to an architecture’s impact on resiliency.
Incorporating resiliency analysis into the software development workflow is another avenue
that if proven useful, could have monumental impact, especially as software continues to
evolve. We intend to leverage gem5 and its existing multi-core CPU and GPU simulation
features in order to evaluate parallel workloads. Overall, Relyzer+ facilitates future work in
any of the aforementioned directions.
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